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THE SCOPE OF WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION IN THE
STATE OF MARYLAND: A COMPREHENSIVE
STATUTE IS NEEDED
John A. Grayt
I.

INTRODUCTION

Contrary to Time magazine's usual practice of choosing only one
"Person of the Year," in January, 2003, it chose three women to symbolize "The Whistleblower."l The three women were Sherron Watkins, employed at that time by Enron,2 Cynthia Cooper, employed by
WorldCom,3 and Coleen Rowley, employed by the FBI.4 Sherron Watkins, a former Enron vice president, reported to Kenneth Lay, Enron's then chairman and CEO, that the company's accounting
methods were improper. 5 Cynthia Cooper, vice president of internal
audits, reported to WorldCom's board of directors that the company
covered up $3.8 billion in losses by phony bookkeeping.6 Cole en
Rowley is an FBI staff attorney who reported to FBI Director Robert
Mueller that the Bureau had ignored pleas from her Minneapolis,
Minnesota, field office to investigate a man subsequently indicted as a
September 11 th co-conspirator. 7
The image of "blowing the whistle" has several connotations. One
is that the sound of a whistle catches and focuses the attention of
others. Another connotation is that of causing an action to stop, as
when a referee blows the whistle on a playing field. The image of the
whistle blower is that of someone who gets the attention of others in
order to stop certain conduct. The three women selected by Time are

t
1.

2.
3.
4.

5.
6.
7.

J.D., 1980, University of Baltimore School of Law. Professor of Law,
Sellinger School of Business and Management, Loyola College, Md.
Richard Lacayo & Amanda Ripley, Persons of the Year: Coleen Rowley, Cynthia
Cooper, Sherron Watkins, TIME, Jan. 6, 2003, at 30, 32.
Id. at 32-33.
Id. at 32. Ms. Cooper was still employed by WorldCom at the time this
article was written.
Id. Ms. Rowley remained employed by the FBI at the time this article was
written.
Id.
Id.
Lacayo & Ripley, supra note 1, at 32. The author describes the subjects as
"three women of ordinary demeanor but exceptional guts and sense ... ";
"heroes at the scene, anointed by circumstance ... "; "people who did right
just by doing their jobs rightly .... " Id.
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each an example of an "internal whistleblower."8 Each tried internally
to stop conduct she considered harmful to the company or illegal by
notifYing superiors within her respective organization. 9 None went to
the press or to enforcement authorities. 10 They are to be admired for
risking retaliation from superiors in their organizations. Possible acts
of retaliation may have included dismissal, decreased opportunities
for promotion, change to less favorable assignments or positions
within the organization, or other adverse actions. l l Fortunately, none
of these women were subject to retaliation and, therefore, did not
need whistleblower protection. 12
This Time issue, and comparable publicity, can lead people to believe that whistle blowers have legal protection when their employers
dismiss or otherwise adversely mistreat them in retaliation for blowing
the whistle either internally, to executive management, or externally,
to the press and/or enforcement authorities. The legal reality, however, is much more complex. Typical whistleblowers are loyal longterm employees, committed to the mission and success of their companies. 13 They typically disclose their concerns externally only after
they have received no corrective response internally, and only after
much agonizing. 14 Often, whistleblowers have few or no legal remedies and pay a considerable personal and professional price.
Whistleblowers have more often than not illustrated the axiom "no
good deed goes unpunished." Whistleblowers frequently lose their
jobs and are often unable to obtain comparable work in the same industry.15 As a result of the great economic and emotional stress that
they undergo, it is not uncommon for whistleblowers' marriages to
8. See Porter v. Reardon Mach. Co., 962 S.W.2d 932, 937 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
"Internal whistle blowing" is contrasted with "external whistleblowing,"
which refers to an employee reporting to the press, law enforcement authorities, or another third party employer, activities that the employee believes to be unethical or illegal. [d.
9. See Lacayo & Ripley, supra note 1, at 32.
10. [d.
11. The National Whistleblower Protection Act, at http://www.whistleblowers.
org/htmi/model_whistleblower_law.html (last visited Mar. 17,2004). "'Retaliatory action' means the discharge, suspension, demotion, ... harassment, blacklisting or the refusal to hire an employee ... or other adverse
employment action taken against an employee in the terms and conditions
of employment, or other actions which interfere with an employees' ability
to engage in protected activity .... " [d. This Act has not currently been
enacted in any jurisdiction. [d.
12. Lacayo & Ripley, supra note 1, at 33. "Their lives may not have been at
stake, but Watkins, Rowley and Cooper put pretty much everything else on
the line. Their jobs, their health, their privacy, their sanity-they risked all
of them .... " [d. at 32.
13. See Marlene Winfield, Whistleblowers as Corporate Safety Net, in WHISTLEBLOWlNG-SUBVERSION OR CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP? 21, 21-22 (Gerald Vinten ed.,
1994).
14. See id.
15. See id. at 22.
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break up, for them to become isolated from colleagues, to lose
friends, and to even attempt suicide. 16 "[W]histle-blowers don't have
an easy time. Almost all say they would not do it again. If they aren't
fired, they're cornered: isolated and made irrelevant. Eventually
many suffer from alcoholism or depression."17 As explained in the
Letter from the National Whistleblowers Center to President George
W. Bush:
Today, the few employees courageous enough to step forward face uncertainty as to whether they can obtain adequate
protection. Some will find a safe harbor, but most will not.
The majority of whistle blowers will either fall into the hole
created by the absence of any protection whatsoever, or will
fail to obtain any relief due to deficiencies in many of the
existing archaic whistleblower laws. 18
Whistleblowers deserve better legal protection and so does the public.
The absence of whistleblower protection is a major disincentive for
concerned employees to act to protect the public by blowing the
whistle.
A recent common law decision in Maryland provides an opportunity to assess the status of whistleblower protection under Maryland
law. Wholey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. recognizes for the first time in Maryland the availability of the tort of wrongful discharge to provide a
remedy to employees fired in retaliation for reporting, in good faith,
suspected criminal activities to public enforcement authorities. 19
Would any of these three Time whistleblowers have legal protection
under current Maryland law if the identical events had occurred today
in Maryland?
In this article, the term "whistleblower" refers, in general, to an employee who in good faith attempts to have his employer stop conduct
that the employee reasonably believes 20 to be injurious to the public21
16. Id.
17. Lacayo & Ripley, supra note 1, at 33.
18. See Letter from National Whistleblowers Center to President George W.
Bush (Dec. 23, 2002), at http://www.whistleblowers.org/bushlet.htm.
19. 370 Md. 38, 70-71,803 A.2d 482, 501 (2002).
20. See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry M. Dworkin, The State of State
Whistleblower Protection, 38 AM. Bus. LJ. 99, 120-21 (2000). The "reasonable
belief' requirement is both subjective and objective. The whistle blower
must actually believe that the employer conduct violates the law, and a reasonable person, given the totality of the circumstances, would also believe
that the employer conduct violates the law. See id.
21. Generally, the whistle blower sees the conduct as significantly injurious to
an unknowing public. See Sam Hananel, Whistle-Blower Report Cites Abuses, at
http://www.whistieblowers.org/Whistie-Blower%20Report%20Cites%20
Abuses.htm (last visited April 9, 2004). Based on a survey of both government and private sector whistleblowers, the National Whistleblower Center
concluded that "[about] 51 percent of the respondents reported fraud or
criminal practices, while 19 percent exposed health and safety problems, 10
percent disclosed environmental problems, 12 percent complained of dis-
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and a violation of the law either through internal efforts-internal
whistleblowing-and/ or by disclosing the conduct externally, either
to the press or to enforcement authorities-external whistleblowing.22
The good faith and reasonable belief standards do not require the
whistle blower to have legal expertise in deciding whether or not specific conduct is indeed a violation of the law. 23 It does, however, preclude any protection for an employee who knowingly makes a false
report to public enforcement authorities. 24 The phrase
"whistleblower protection" refers to a law-federal, state, statutory or
common law-that provides a remedy to an employee discharged or
otherwise adversely treated in retaliation for the employee's efforts to
cause the employer to stop company-controlled conduct that the employee believes in good faith is in violation of the law. 25
This article first examines whistle blower protection available under
Maryland statutory law26 and then the recently explained common law
protection established in the WhoUry decision. 27 In conclusion, the Article recommends that the Maryland General Assembly enact a comprehensive Whistleblower Protection Act. 28

22.

23.
24.
25.

26.
27.
28.

criminatory practices, and 9 percent found wrongdoing in the medical profession." Id.
"Whistle blowing" has been defined as "the disclosure by organizational
members (former or current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices
under the control of their employers to persons or organizations that may
be able to effect action." Elletta San grey Callahan et al., Integrating Trends
in Whistleblowing and Corporate Governance: Promoting Organizational Effectiveness, Societal Responsibility, and Employee Empowerment, 40 AM. Bus. LJ. 177,
178 (2002).
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
WhoUry, 370 Md. at 59 n.13, 803 A.2d at 494 n.13.
See generally Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 20, at 99-100. Typically, the
whistleblower perceives the conduct not only as dangerous to the health
and safety of an unsuspecting public but also as contrary to the express
values of the organization. See Ronald Duska, Whistleblowing and Employee
Loyalty, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BUSINESS ETHICS 295, 300 n.2 (Joseph R.
Desjardins & JohnJ. McCall eds., 1985). The act of whistle blowing, which
some employees perceive as an act of disloyalty, is perceived by the
whistle blower as an act of loyalty. See AJ. Geare, An Employee's Duty of Loyalty: New Zealand Law and Practice, 20 COMPo LAB. L. & POL'y J. 283, 284
(1999). The point that to blow the whistle for reasons of morality is to act
in one's employer's best interests and, therefore, involves no disloyalty is
cogently argued by Robert A. Larmer, Whistleblowing and Employee Loyalty, 11
J. Bus. ETHICS 125, 125-28 (1992). Larmer advances this argument against
the standard view that the whistle blower's higher loyalty to the public good
trumps his/her loyalty to the employer, and against the view of Duska that
employees do not have a duty of loyalty to an employer. See Duska, supra, at
297-99.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part V.
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STATUTORY WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION UNDER MARYLAND LA~9

There is no single comprehensive whistleblower statute in Maryland
that covers private sector and public employees and protects both internal and external whistle blowers. 30 The Maryland legislature has enacted four whistleblower protection statutes, each specific to a
particular set of circumstances with its own enforcement process and
statutory remedy.31
A.

Maryland Whistleblower Law zn the Executive Branch of State
Government

One such statute is the Maryland Whistleblower Law in the Executive Branch of State Government (the "Executive Act").32 This statute
provides a remedy to any employee of the executive branch who has
been adversely treated for" (1) reporting what the employee reasonably believes to be: (i) an abuse of authority, gross mismanagement, or
gross waste of money; (ii) a substantial and specific danger to public
health or safety; or (iii) a violation of the law; or (2) for seeking a
remedy provided under this Act."33 To obtain a remedy for an adverse retaliatory employment action, the employee may file a complaint with the Secretary of Budget and Management. 34 If the
Secretary determines that a reprisal has occurred in violation of the
Executive Act, the Secretary may:
(1) order the removal of any related detrimental information from the complainant'S State personnel records;
(2) require the head of the principal unit to:
(i)
hire, promote, or reinstate the complainant or
end the complainant's suspension from
employment;
(ii) award the complainant back pay to the day of the
violation;
(iii) grant the complainant leave or seniority;
29. All states encourage some form of whistle blowing via statutes that protect
the reporter from retaliation. See Callahan et aI., supra note 22, at 189-90.
These laws vary considerably addressing such other issues as to whom the
whistle should be blown, whether motive should be considered, whether
the whistle blower may benefit from reporting, what standard of evidence of
wrongdoing should be required, and what remedy should be provided to a
whistle blower who suffers retaliation, among others. See id.
30. See infra Part ILA-E.
31. MD. CODE ANN., STATE PERS. & PENS. §§ 5-301 to 5-307 (1997 & Supp.
2003); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH Occ. §§ 1-501 to 1-506 (Supp. 2003); MD.
CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 5-604 (1999); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49b, § 16
(2003).
32. MD. CODE ANN., STATE PERS. & PENS. §§ 5-301 to 5-307.
33. Id. § 5-305.
34. [d. §§ 5-305, 5-309.
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take appropriate disciplinary action against any individual who caused the violation; and
take any other remedial action .... 35

A determination by the Secretary of whether a reprisal in violation of
the Executive Act has occurred or has not occurred may be appealed
to the Office of Administrative Hearings, whose decision is in turn
subject to judicial review. 36 Both the administrative law judge and the
reviewing court may award reasonable attorney's fees and legal expenses to a prevailing complainant. 37
The Executive Act's protection covers only employees of the executive branch of the state government. 38 The Executive Act is ambiguous in that it does not indicate whether it applies to internal as well as
to external whistle blowers. It does not state expressly "to whom" the
employee must have disclosed the information for the disclosure of
which the employee has suffered a reprisal. Also, the executive
branch employee has no private cause of action. 39 If the Secretary's
determination favors the employee, the burden is on the executive
branch employer to appeal for a review by an administrative law judge
and, if that outcome is still unfavorable, to a circuit court. 40 If the
Secretary's determination is unfavorable to the employee, then the
burden is on the employee to move forward with the appeal process. 41
What additional protection, if any, does the Executive Act provide
to those executive branch employees who have tenure as civil servants
beyond the protection already provided under state statutory and
state and federal constitutional safeguards against retaliatory employment actions? Maryland's Personnel and Pensions Article provides a
grievance procedure to challenge inappropriate disciplinary actions
by supervisors and managers as well as providing remedies when such
actions are determined to have occurred. 42 The Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution imposes on
public sector employers, substantive and procedural requirements
whenever the state acts to deprive a tenured civil servant of his/her
"property right" in a government job. 43 Substantive due process re35. Id. § 5-309(e).
36. Id. § 5-310.
37. /d. §§ 5-310(d), 5-311.
38. Id. § 5-301. "This subtitle applies to all employees and State employees who
are applicants for positions in the Executive Branch of State government,
including a unit with an independent personnel system." Id.
39. Id. § 5-307. "Election of procedures. - An employee ... may elect to file:
(1) a complaint under § 5-309 of this subtitle; or (2) a grievance under
Title 12 of this article." Id. § 5-307(a).
40. Id. § 5-310(a), (e); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-222 (1999).
41. MD. CODE ANN., STATE PERS. & PENS. § 5-31O(a), (e); MD. CODE ANN., STATE
GoV'T § 10-222.
42. See generally MD. CODE ANN., STATE PERS. & PENS. § 12-103 (1997 & Supp.
2003).
43. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAw 586 (West 1994).
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quires that the state's deprivation be reasonably related to a legitimate
state interest; that is, the state must be prepared to show that any adverse employment action in retaliation for whistleblowing is not arbitrary and capricious. 44 The statute expressly provides that it "does not
prohibit a personnel action that would have been taken regardless of
a disclosure of information."45 Procedural due process requires that,
prior to deprivation, the employee be given adequate notice and an
opportunity to tell his or her side of the story.46

B.

The Health Care Worker Whistleblower Protection Act

A second statute, enacted in 2002, is the Health Care Worker
Whistleblower Protection Act (the "Health Care Act"),47 which provides protection to board-certified or licensed health-care workers, but
expressly excludes state employees. 48 The statute prohibits an employer from taking or refusing to take any personnel action as a reprisal against a covered employee because the employee:
(I) Discloses or threatens to disclose to a supervisor49 or
board50 an activity, policy, or practice of the employer
that is in violation of a law, rule, or regulation;
(2) Provides information to or testifies before any public
body conducting an investigation, hearing, or inquiry
into any violation of a law, rule, or regulation by the employer; or
(3) Objects to or refuses to participate in any activity, policy,
or practice in violation of a law, rule, or regulation. 51
The whistle blower protection is available only if:
(1) The employee has a reasonable, good faith belief that

the employer has, or still is, engaged in a violation ... ;
44. Nicholas v. Penn. State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 142 (3d Cir. 2000).
45. MD. CODE ANN., STATE PERS. & PENS. § 5-302(b).
46. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAw: CAsES AND
MATERIALS 980 (4th ed. 1998); see also ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 43, at
586-88.
47. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH Occ. §§ 1-501 to 1-506 (Supp. 2003).
48. ld. § 1-501. Section 1-501(c) states: "(1) 'Employee' means any individual
licensed or certified by a board under this article who performs services for
and under the control and direction of an employer for wages or other
remuneration. (2) 'Employee' does not include a State employee." ld. § 1501 (c).
49. Section 1-501 (d) defines a "supervisor" as "any individual within an employer's organization who has the authority to direct and control the work
performance of an employee, or who has managerial authority to take corrective action regarding the violation of a law, rule, or regulation of which
the employee complains." ld. § 1-501 (d).
50. '''Board' means any board established under [the Health Occupations] article." ld.§1-501(c).
51. ld. § 1-502(1), (2), (3).
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(2) The employer's activity, policy, or practice that is the

subject matter of the disclosure poses a substantial and
specific danger to the public health or safety; and
(3) Before reporting to the board:
(i) The employee has reported the activity, policy, or
practice to a supervisor or administrator of the employer in writing and afforded the employer a reasonable opportunity to correct the activity, policy,
or practice; or
(ii) If the employer has a corporate compliance plan
specifying who to notify of an alleged violation of a
rule, law, or regulation, the employee has followed
the plan. 52
The Health Care Act provides a private cause of action, which must
be brought within one year after the reprisal occurred or within one
year after the employee first became aware of the reprisa1. 53 A court
may:
(1) Issue an injunction to restrain continued violation ... ;
(2) Reinstate the employee to the same, or an equivalent position held before the violation ... ;
(3) Remove any adverse personnel record entries based on
or related to the violation . . . ;
(4) Reinstate full fringe benefits and seniority rights;
(5) Require compensation for lost wages, benefits, and
other remuneration; and
(6) Assess reasonable attorney's fees and other litigation expenses against:
(i) the employer, if the employee prevails .... 54
The court may also assess attorney's fees and litigation expenses
against the employee if the court determines that the employee
brought the action "in bad faith and without basis in law or fact."55
The employer has a valid defense if the personnel action claimed to
be a reprisal for whistle blowing was based on grounds other than the
employee's exercise of any rights protected under the Health Care
Act. 56
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

See id. § 1-503(1), (2), (3).
See id. § 1-504(a), (b).
See id. § 1-505(1) to (6).
[d. § 1-505(6) (ii).
See id. § 1-506. The American Nurses Association (ANA) and its local affiliate, the Maryland Nurses Association, were instrumental in having this law
enacted to protect nurses against employment retaliation for reporting
harmful patient care. See 2003 Legislation: WhistleBlower Protection (May,
2003), at http://nursingworld.org/gova/state/2003/whistle.pdf; Maryland
Nurses Association: 2003 Legislative Platform, at http://www.nursingworld.
org/ snas/ md/2003Ieg.htm.
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First, the Health Care Act provides a private cause of action with a
one-year statute of limitation. 57 Second, it does not protect all healthcare workers in Maryland. The Health Care Act covers board-certified
or licensed-health-care workers in the private sector, or those who
work for local-public-health-care entities. 58 It does not protect nonboard licensed or uncertified-health-care workers in either the private
or public sector-non-medical personnel such as managers or administrators. It does not protect licensed health-care workers who are
state employees. 59 Third, the Health Care Act provides protection
only if: (a) a covered worker has first formally and in writing engaged
in internal whistleblowing; and (b) the report concerns employer activity that creates a substantial and specific danger to the public health
or safety, but not when the illegal employer activity disclosed violates
other laws-e.g., fraudulent financial reporting. 60 Fourth, the Health
Care Act provides a remedy for internal whistleblowing. 61 The Health
Care Act creates a situation where a private health-care employer has
an opportunity to stop an activity that creates a substantial and specific
danger to the public health or safety; if it does not stop, it may not
retaliate against the licensed health-care worker who first called it to
the employer's attention and subsequently reported it to the board.

C.

Maryland Occupational and Safety Health Act (MOSHA)

A third Maryland whistle blower protection statute is the MOSHA
anti-retaliation provision enacted to protect employees for reporting
occupational safety and health violations. 62 The provision states that:
(b) An employer or other person may not discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because the
employee:
(1) Files a complaint related to [occupational safety and
health] ;
(2) Brings an action ... or a proceeding ... or causes
the action or proceeding to be brought;
(3) Has testified or will testify in an action ... or a proceeding . . . ; or
(4) Exercises, for the employee or another, a right
under this title. 63
An employee who believes that an employer or other person has discharged or otherwise discriminated against the employee must submit, within thirty days after the alleged discrimination, a signed,
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Occ. § 1-504(b).
[d. § 1-501.
See id.
[d. § 1-503.
[d. § 1-502(1).
See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 5-604(b) (1999).
[d.

MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH
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written complaint to the Commissioner of Labor and Industry.64 If
the Commissioner determines that an employer or other person has
violated the prohibition against retaliatory action, the Commissioner
must file a complaint in the appropriate circuit court to enjoin the
violation,65 to reinstate the employee to the former position with back
pay,66 and for other appropriate relief. 67 Within ninety days after the
Commissioner receives a complaint, the Commissioner must notify
the employee of the determination. 68 Section 5-215(a) permits any
person aggrieved by any order of the Commissioner to obtain judicial
review in the circuit court. 69 The Act does not provide a private cause
of action. 70
Nothing in MOSHA purports to give an employee any private right of action in court for a violation of a health and
safety standard .... [T]he remedy afforded is a complaint
to the Commissioner, who alone is authorized to file an action . . .. [T]he exclusive remedy for a . MOSHA related
wrongful discharge [is] under art. 89, § 43(b) and that a tort
action under Adler did not exist for such a discharge. 71

D.

Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA)

The fourth statute is Article 49B, the FEPA, which has an anti-retaliation provision to protect private and public sector employees who
oppose or report discriminatory practices. 72 FEPA uses the following
language:
It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of its employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency to discriminate against
any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate
against any member thereof or applicant for membership,
because the individual has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice ... or because the individual has
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in an~ manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing .... 3
If an employee thinks that the employer has committed a retaliatory
act, the employee must file a complaint within six months of the act
64. [d. § 5-604 (c) (2).

65. [d. § 5-604 (d) (2).
66. [d.

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

[d.
[d. § 5-604(d) (3).
[d. § 5-215(a)(l), (2).
[d. § 5-215(d) (3).
Silkworth v. Ryder Truck Rental Inc., 70 Md. App. 264, 269-70, 520 A.2d
1124,1127-28 (1987). See also Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 830 F.2d 1303
(4th Cir. 1987).
72. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 16(f) (2003).
73. [d.

2004]

Whistleblower Protection in the State of Maryland

235

with the Human Relations Commission (HRC) for investigation. 74 If
the HRC finds that there is probable cause for believing a retaliatory
act has been committed, the HRC must first undertake to remedy the
act by conference, conciliation and persuasion; 75 and if that fails, file a
complaint with a hearing examiner. 76 If the hearing examiner determines, upon all the evidence, that a discriminatory act has been committed, Article 49B, section 11 (e) of the Maryland Annotated Code
provides:
[T] he remedy may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay ... ,
or any other equitable relief that is deemed appropriate.
The award of monetary relief shall be limited to a 36-month
period. The complainant may not be awarded monetary relief for losses incurred between the time of the Commission's
final determination and the final determination by the circuit court or higher appellate court, as the case may be. Interim earning or amounts earnable with reasonable
diligence by the person or persons discriminated against
shall operate to reduce the monetary relief otherwise
allowable. 77
"Opposing" a discriminatory employment practice includes protesting
it internally (internal whistleblowing) as well as filing a complaint with
the HRC (external whistle blowing) , regardless of whether or not the
source is a direct victim of a discriminatory practice. 78 Section 16(f)
of the Maryland FEPA79 is based on its federal counterpart, § 2000e3(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 80 In Chappell v. Southern Maryland
Hospital, the Court of Appeals of Maryland stated that "[t]he opposition ... clauses ... have been liberally applied by the courts to shield
employees who speak out against an employer's unlawful employment
•
practIces
.... "81
74. Id. § 9A(a).
75. Id. § lOeb).
76. Id. § 11 (a).
77. Id. § lICe).
78. See id. § 9A; see also Wholey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 370 Md. 38, 63, 803

A.2d 482, 496-97 (2002).
79. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 16(f).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2001). Maryland courts use federal cases interpreting the federal act for guidance in applying section 16(f) of the Maryland
Act. See Chappell v. S. Md. Hosp., Inc., 320 Md. 483, 494, 578 A.2d 766, 772
(1990); see also Ford v. Dept. of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 149 Md. App.
488,501,817 A.2d 264, 272 (2003).
81. 320 Md. at 494-95, 578 A.2d at 772-73. The court cited the following
examples:
E.E.O.G. v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 720 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir.1983) (a
letter protesting unspecified "racism" and "discrimination" in employer's practices is a permissible form of protected opposition to
discriminatory practices); Armstrong v. Index Journal Co., 647 F.2d
441 (4th Cir.1981) (female employee who was discharged because
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In Chappell, the plaintiff, Robert Chappell, claimed that Southern
Maryland Hospital had fired him in retaliation for his reporting employment practice violations to hospital senior management. 82 The
court determined that "Chappell can pursue a remedy under both the
state and federal anti-discrimination statutes for his discharge from
employment for apprising his employer of allegedly discriminatory
employment practices."83
Maryland's anti-discrimination statute does not contain a "provision
for a private right of action to enforce its prohibition of discrimination."84 If the complaining employee, however, works for an employer with fourteen or fewer employees and is dismissed in
retaliation for opposing employer improprieties, the employee may
bring a tort of abusive discharge. 85 In addition, the Maryland FEPA
does not authorize direct civil actions by the Commission in circuit

82.

83.
84.
85.

she complained to her employer about its discriminatory practices
of soliciting applicants for sales work according to their sex, and by
limiting the job opportunities and base pay of its female salespersons, was entitled to reinstatement with back pay and salary equal
to male counterparts, court costs and attorney's fees); Berg v. La
Crosse Cooler Co., 612 F.2d 1041, 1045 (7th Cir.1980) ("By protecting
employees from retaliation, [§ 2000e-3(a)] is designed to encourage employees to call to their employers' attention discriminatory practices of which the employer may be unaware or which
might result in protracted litigation to determine their legality if
they are not voluntarily changed."); Eichman v. Ind. State Univ. Bd.
of Trustees, 597 F.2d 11 04 (7th Cir.1979) (plaintiff who alleged that
he assisted a woman who was trying to exercise her Title VII rights
to retain her job, and that his discharge was in retaliation for that
assistance, sufficiently states a claim under § 2000e-3(a)); Jones v.
Lyng, 669 F. Supp. 1108, 1121 (D.D.C. 1986) ("The 'opposition
clause' protects statements by a person ... who is not himself the
direct victim of the discriminatory practice but who opposes such
discrimination against others."); Jenkins v. Orkin Exterminating Co.,
Inc., 646 F. Supp. 1274 (E.D.Tex.1986) (employee who was terminated for telephoning district manager to complain on behalf of
another employee he believed to be experiencing sexual harassment was protected under the opposition clause of § 2000e-3(a));
Crockwell v. Blackmon-Mooring Steamatic, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 800 (W.D.
Tenn. 1985) (plaintiff demonstrated a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge under § 2000e-3(a) by showing that her stated objections to her employer regarding sexual harassment of a co-worker
most likely prompted her discharge); and Spence v. Local 1250,
United Auto Workers, 595 F. Supp. 6 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (employee
who was fired for speaking out against his employer's practices,
which he believed to be racially discriminatory against a fellow employee, was participating in protected activity under § 2000e-3(a)).
Id.
Chappell, 320 Md. at 485-86, 578 A.2d at 768.
Id. at 496, 578 A.2d at 773.
Pritchett v. Gen. Motors Corp., 650 F. Supp. 758, 761 (D. Md. 1986).
See Molesworth v. Brandon, 341 Md. 621, 628-29, 672 A.2d 608, 612 (1996).
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court; a "plaintiff ordinarily must invoke and exhaust his administrative remed[ies] before maintaining an action."86
E.

Summary of Maryland Whistleblower Statutes

In summary, Maryland statutes provide a remedy to whistle blowers
in four specific situations: (1) when an employee of the executive
branch discloses a violation of the law or abuse of authority or gross
waste of funds in the executive branch; (2) when licensed health-care
workers, other than state employees, report or threaten to report illegal activity creating a substantial and specific health threat; (3) when
an employee discloses a MOSHA violation to MOSHA authorities; and
(4) when an employee opposes a discriminatory act. Each statute provides a statutory remedy and a procedure to obtain it. Of these four
statutes, only the Health Care Act expressly provides a private cause of
action as the enforcement mechanism. 87 Maryland common law recognizes the availability of the tort of abusive discharge for employees
injured in violation of its FEPA anti-retaliation provision who work for
an employer with fourteen or fewer employees. 88
The language in two of the statutes reviewed indicates that they do
protect internal whistle blowers. Maryland's Health Care Act provides
a private cause of action to cover health-care workers whose employer
retaliates against them for threatening to make a disclosure of what
the employee reasonably believes in good faith to be an illegal act by
their employer or only for having reported such to a supervisor. 89
The anti-retaliation provision of the FEPA indicates that it is a violation of the statute for an employer to retaliate against an employee
who "opposes" internally what the employee in good faith considers to
be a discriminatory act in violation of the law. 90 "Opposing" may be
no more than internally protesting the allegedly illegal activity. The
following table compares the four statutes on a number of points:

86. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations v. Downey Communications Inc., 110
Md. App. 493, 531, 678 A.2d 55, 74 (1996) (quoting Md.-Nat'l Capital Park
& Planning Comm'n v. Crawford, 307 Md. 1,25 n.10, 511 A.2d 1079, 1091
n.10 (1986)).
87. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH Occ. § 1-504 (Supp. 2003); see also supra notes 5154 and accompanying text.
88. Molesworth v. Brandon, 341 Md. 621, 637, 672 A.2d 608, 616 (1996).
89. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH Occ. § 1-502.
90. MD. ANN. CODE, art. 49B, § 16(f) (2003).
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Employees
Covered

Enforcement
Process

Disclosure:
Subject Matter

Disclosure: to
whom

1. Executive
Employees
Whistle-blower
Protection Act

State Executive Branch
Employees

Complaint to
Secretary of
Budget and
Management
with appeal to
ALJ and
Courts

1. Abuse of
authority,
gross waste of
money
2. Specific,
substantial
danger to
public health
or safety
3. Violation
of law

Not specified.

2. Health
Care Workers
Whistle-blowers Protection
Act

Licensed or
Board Certified Health
Care Workers
other than
state employees

Private cause
of action with
one year statute of limitations

Specific and
substantial
danger to
public health
or safety

Requires internal reporting before external reporting to state
board

3. OSHA antiretaliation
provision

Any employee

With 10 days
to Commission-er of Labor and Industry

MOSHA violation of OSHA
rule

External only

4. FEPA antiretaliation
provision

All private
and public
sector employees

If 15 or more
employees, to
HRC; if fewer,
tort of abusive
discharge.

Opposing
and/or reporting discrimina-tory
employment
practice

Internal opposition, external reporting
to HRC

Statute

None of these statutory provisions would have benefited any of the
Time whistleblowers if they had been victims of retaliatory actions by
employers in the state of Maryland. 91 This is because none of the
whistleblowers were employees of the executive branch of government, opposed a discriminatory activity, was a licensed health-care
worker disclosing a specific and substantial danger to the public safety
and health, or adversely treated for reporting a MOSHA violation. 92 If
existing Maryland statutory law would not have provided any of them
with a remedy for an employer retaliatory action, would Maryland
common law?
91. See Amanda Ripley & Maggie Sieger, Persons of the Year: Coleen /Wwiey, Cynthia
Copper, Sherron Watkins, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002, at 34.
92. See generally id. Furthermore, none of the whistleblowers were fired for refusing to engage in an illegal act as a condition of employment, for which
the tort of abusive discharge provides a remedy. See generally id.
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MARYLAND COMMON LAW: WHOLEY V. SEARS, ROEBUCK, &
CO.: 93 THE "EXTERNAL WHISTLEBLOWING" TORT OF ABUSIVE DISCHARGE

The tort of abusive discharge is a common-law theory of recovery
that provides a remedy when an employer's dismissal of an employee
contravenes a clear mandate of public policy,94 and the source of that
policy does not provide a remedy.95 Typical examples include when
an employer fires an employee in retaliation for the employee's refusal to commit an illegal act at the command of the employer,96 to
forego the exercise of a legal right,97 or to forego the exercise of an
important civic duty.98 This tort also arises when an employer's motivation contravenes Maryland anti-discrimination laws that do not provide a statutory remedy.99

A.

Circuit Court of Anne Arundel County.

Sears employed Mr. Wholey for twenty-four years as a security officer, and during most of that time he was simultaneously employed as
a law enforcement officer. lOo His duties included "investigating suspicious behavior and reporting thefts of the store's merchandise by both
93. 370 Md. 38,803 A.2d 482 (2002).
94. See Molesworth v. Brandon, 341 Md. 621, 629, 672 A.2d 608, 612 (1996).
While the source of a claimed public policy might be a constitution, a statute, administrative regulations, or common-law decisions, the public policy
must be clearly mandated to serve as the basis for a wrongful discharge
action because the clarity of the mandate "limits judicial forays into the
wilderness of discerning 'public policy' without clear direction from a legislative or regulatory source." Milton v. lIT Research Inst., 138 F.3d 519, 523
(4th Cir. 1998).
95. See Porterfield v. Masari II, Inc., 142 Md. App. 134, 141, 788 A.2d 242, 24546 (2002).
96. Kesslerv. Equity Mgmt., Inc., 82 Md. App. 577, 589-90, 572 A.2d 1144, 115051 (1990) (holding wrongful discharge action lies for termination of at-will
employee for refusal to violate apartment tenant's right to privacy).
97. See Erwing v. Koppers Co., 312 Md. 45, 48, 50, 437 A.2d 1173, 1174-75
(1988) (holding abusive discharge claim lies for terminating employee
solely for filing worker's compensation claim).
98. See Bleich v. Florence Crittenton Servs. of Baltimore, Inc., 98 Md. App. 123,
135, 140, 632 A.2d 463, 469, 471-72 (1993) (Finding that a wrongful discharge claim will lie for termination of an employee who carries out a statutory duty to report child abuse or neglect).
99. See Molesworth, 341 Md. at 630, 636-37, 672 A.2d at 613-14,616 (holding that
where an employer had fewer than fifteen employees the tort of abusive
discharge was available to employees to remedy gender based discharge because of lack of statutory remedy). See also John A. Gray, Statutory Workforce
Size Requirement and the Tort of Abusive Discharge: Small Emplayers Beware, 47
lAB. LJ. 13, 15 (1996) [hereinafter Abusive Discharge]; John A. Gray,
Workforce Size and Remedies for Discrimination in Emplayment: Wrongful Discharge
and Future Possibilities, 15 MIDWEST L. REv. 79 (1997) [hereinafter Wrongful
Discharge] .
100. Wholey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 370 Md. 38, 43, 803 A.2d 482, 484-85
(2002).

240

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 33

customers and employees."101 Mr. Wholey reported to his Sears supervisor what appeared to be repeated thefts of company property by
a store manager and was authorized to install a sUlveillance camera in
the suspect's office.102 Subsequently, he was ordered to remove the
camera and was fired shortly thereafter. 103 Mr. Wholey contended
that Sears fired him in retaliation for investigating and reporting the
store manager's suspected criminal activity and filed a wrongful discharge claim.l04 Sears contended that it fired Mr. Wholey for failing
to perform his duties the prior winter during a blizzard. l05
At trial, Sears argued that there was no clear mandate of public policy in Maryland that favored the investigation of criminal activity;
therefore, Mr. Wholey's termination did not violate public policy, and
was not actionable as a matter of law. 106 The trial court disagreed with
this argument holding that Maryland public policy favors the investigation and prosecution of crimes. 107 The jury returned a verdict
against Sears on Mr. Wholey's wrongful discharge claim and awarded
$166,000 in damages. 108
.
B.

Court oj Special Appeals.

A threejudge panel of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
reversed the judgment of the trial court and unanimously held that
Sears had violated no clear mandate of public policy when it terminated Mr. Wholey.lOg On appeal, Sears relied on the Fourth Circuit's
reasoning in Adler v. American Standard Corporation ("Adler III").1 10 In
Adler III, the court considered whether an employer violates Maryland
public policy when it terminates an employee in retaliation for his
disclosure of wrongdoing to higher corporate officers. I II The court
held "that, while the public policy of Maryland clearly proscribes terminating an at-will employee for refusing to engage in illegal activity
or for complying with, or stating an intention to fulfill, a statutorily
101.
102.
103.
104.

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
1lO.

Ill.

[d. at 44, 803 A.2d at 485.
[d.
[d. at 44-45, 803 A.2d at 485.
[d. at 46,803 A.2d at 486. In Maryland, "wrongful discharge" is used interchangeably with "abusive discharge" and "retaliatory discharge" to refer to
the tort of abusive discharge. Lora Holmberg Hess & Lisa J. Kahn, Survey:
Developments in Maryland Law, 1990-1991, 51 MD. L. REv. 681, 682 n.18
(1992).
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Wholey, 139 Md. App. 642, 647, 779 A.2d 408, 411
(2001), affd, 370 Md. 38,803 A.2d 482 (2002).
[d.
[d. at 648, 779 A.2d at 411.
[d. at 642, 779 A.2d at 408.
[d. at 663, 779 A.2d at 420.
[d. at 648-49, 779 A.2d at 412 (citing Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 830 F.2d
1303 (4th Cir. 1987)).
See Adler, 830 F.2d at 1303.
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prescribed duty, it did not proscribe terminating such an employee
for 'whistle blowing.' "112 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit stated:
In the absence of a clear declaration by [the Maryland] legislature or the Maryland Court of Appeals that an action for
[wrongful] discharge should be extended to situations where
the discharged employee claims to have had the knowledge
and intent to report wrongdoing to a higher corporate official, this court should not create such a ruling . . .. [The
plaintiff's] allegations and evidence reveal nothing more
than his discharge resulting from his intention to blow the
whistle on illegal activities condoned by his supervisors ...
and their efforts to protect themselves by discharging him.
This ... does not involve an effort by [the plaintiff] to fulfill
a statutorily rsrescribed duty nor his failure to engage in illegal activity. 1 3
While Sears relied on Adler III to support its argument on appeal,
Mr. Wholey relied on the Illinois case of Palmateer v. International Harvester. 114 In Palmateer, an at-will employee reported suspected criminal
activity by a co-employee to the police, and offered to assist them in
the investigation and trial. II 5
When his employer learned of this, [he was fired]. In a
[four] to [three] decision, the Supreme Court of Illinois
held that terminating an at-will employee for reporting a
crime to the authorities is contrary to the 'clear public policy
favoring investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses,'
and therefore gives rise to a cause of action for wrongful
discharge. 1 16
Adler III explained that the plaintiff had no statutory legal duty
under Maryland law to report suspected criminal activity and the employer did not require the employee to engage in any unlawful activity.1l7 In contrast, Palmateer sustained a cause of action for an external
whistle blower even in the absence of any statutory duty to report criminal activity or any employer requirement to commit illegal activity. I IS
112. Sears, IWebuck & Co., 139 Md. App. at 653,779 A.2d at 414 (discussing Adler,
830 F.2d at 1306-07).
113. Adler, 830 F.2d at 1307. In Wholey, the Court of Appeals of Maryland acknowledged the correctness of the Fourth Circuit's application in Adler III
and in Milton. See Wholey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 370 Md. 38, 69 n.18, 807
A.2d 482, 500 n.18 (2002). "The Fourth Circuit refused to find a violation
of Maryland public policy for 'whistle-blowing,' particularly when the employee had no legal duty to report the criminal activity." Id. (quoting Milton v.
lIT Research, Inc., 138 F.3d 519 (4th Cir. 1998)).
114. 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981).
115. Id. at 127.
116. Sears, IWebuck & Co., 139 Md. App. at 654-55,779 A.2d at 415-16 (discussing
Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 880).
117. See Adler, 830 F.2d at 1307.
118. See Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 881.
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Mter reviewing the cases on which the parties relied on appeal, the
court of special appeals then discussed Milton v. lIT Research Institute. 119 "In Milton, the Fourth Circuit, applying Maryland law, adhered
to its holding in Adler III that discharging an at-will employee for
'whistle-blowing' is not a violation of a clearly mandated Maryland
public policy, unless the employee had a legal duty to report the criminal activity."120 In Milton, the employee became convinced that the
corporation was engaging in illegal schemes to avoid reporting taxable income to the IRS, and reported his concerns to management. 121
When his superiors failed to rectify the problem, he reported his concerns to the chairman of the board. 122 His superiors then demoted
him.123 When he complained, they fired him.124 Applying Maryland
law, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the
plaintiff did not and could not allege that he was fired for refusing to
engage in unlawful activities himself or that he had a statutory duty to
disclose the company's wrongdoing to its board. 125 The court stated
that:
Milton argues that his fiduciary obligations as an officer of
IITRI supply the legal duty. . . . The broad fiduciary obligations of "care and loyalty" are simply too general to qualify as
a specific legal duty that will support the claim that his discharge violates a "clear mandate of public policy."126
Based on its acceptance of the Adler III and Milton decisions, the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, in deciding Sears, Roebuck &
Co., concluded:
The conduct at issue in this case is one employee's act of
investigating possible theft from his employer by a co-employee. Nothing in Maryland's general theft statute or any
other enactment mandates that a citizen of Maryland who
suspects that another person (co-employee or otherwise)
may have committed a theft must report, let alone investigate, that suspicion. To be sure, it might serve the public
good for citizens to look into possible criminal acts of others,
including co-employees, and report their suspicions to the
authorities. We do not subscribe to the view, however, that
conduct we might think would promote the good of society
as a whole is, because we think so, favored public policy of
this State. To find a clear mandate of public policy, we must
119. 138 F.3d 519 (4th Cir. 1998).
120. Sears, Rnebuck & Co., 139 Md. App. at 657, 779 A.2d at 416-17 (discussing
Milton, 138 F.3d at 519).
121. Milton, 138 F.3d at 521.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See id. at 521-23.
126. Id. at 523.

2004]

Whistleblower Protection in the State of Maryland

243

look to already existing sources of policy expression. In the
absence of any legislative or existing judicial pronouncement
in this state directing private citizens to investigate possible
acts of theft by co-workers or others, we find no origin for
the public policy essential to Wholey's wrongful discharge
claim. 127
... In Maryland, we have found a clear mandate of public
policy in favor of reporting possible criminal conduct of
others to the authorities when, by statute, a person is required to make such a report. There was no such statutory
directive in this case. 128

c.

Court oj Appeals oj Maryland

The Court of Appeals of Maryland recognized the availability of the
tort of abusive discharge in the absence of any legal duty to report. 129
There were three opinions: (1) a plurality of three judges creating a
new application of the tort of abusive discharge for external
whistle blowing, but rejecting its application to the plaintiff-employee
internal whistleblower;13o (2) a second opinion by two judges concurring in the judgment against the plaintiff, but rejecting the reasoning
of the plurality;131 and (3) two dissenting judges asserting a broader
scope for the tort's availability, implicitly inclusive of the plurality'S
position but going beyond it. 132
The two principal issues were whether Maryland recognized the
availability of the tort of abusive discharge to provide a remedy for
whistleblowers and, if so, whether or not it was available to the plaintiff-discharged employee. 133
The decisional issue before this Court is whether Maryland
recognizes a common law public policy exception to the atwill-employee-doctrine whereby discharging an employee for
investigating and reporting the suspected criminal activity of
a co-worker would constitute a wrongful discharge. We conclude that a clear public policy mandate exists in the State of
127. Sears, Rnebuck & Co., 139 Md. App. at 661, 779 A.2d at 419.
128. Id. at 662, 779 A.2d at 419-20. For example, Maryland Family Law Article
provisions and implementing regulations require specific professionals and
law enforcement personnel to report suspected child abuse or neglect to
state authorities. See Bleich v. Florence Crittenton Servs. of Baltimore, 98
Md. App. 123, 135-46,632 A.2d 463, 469-75 (1993). Firing an employee for
complying with these requirements constitutes the tort of abusive discharge
because neither the statute creating the obligation nor its implementing
regulations provide a civil remedy for violations. Id.
129. See Wholey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 370 Md. 38, 70-71, 803 A.2d 482, 501
(2002) (plurality opinion).
130. See id. at 63-67, 803 A.2d at 496-99 (plurality opinion).
131. See id. at 71-76, 803 A.2d at 501-04 (concurring opinion).
132. See id. at 76-77, 803 A.2d at 504-05 (dissenting opinion).
133. See id. at 48, 803 A.2d at 487.
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Maryland which protects employees from a termination
based upon the reporting of suspected criminal activities to
the appropriate law enforcement authorities. While we recognize such an exception, the petitioner's actions in this
case, i.e. the investigation of suspected criminal activity of a
store manager and reporting of that susEicion to his supervisors, do not qualify for this exception. 1 4
Five of the seven judges held that the tort was available for external
whistleblowers;135 three of these, only for external whistleblowers;136
and the other two for all whistleblowers. 137 The remaining two judges
completely rejected the availability of the tort for any
whistleblowers. 138
Is there a
clear mandate of
public policy?

Is the tort
available to
this plaintiff?

Plurality (3)

Yes.

No.

Concurring in result. (2)

No.

No.

Yes, but in a
wider sense.

Yes.

Dissenting (2)

Before resolving whether the tort of abusive discharge provided a
remedy for whistle blowers, the court of appeals had to answer two
questions: First, whether there was a clear mandate of public policy in
Maryland in favor of reporting suspected criminal activity; and, second, whether there was a statutory remedy available. 139
The plurality found the clear mandate of public policy in a state
criminal statute not even discussed by the lower courts. 140 An "express statutory mandate" makes it a misdemeanor offense for a person
"who harms or injures another's person or property in retaliation for
134. Id. at 43, 803 A.2d at 484.
135. See id. at 43, 803 A.2d at 484 (plurality opinion) (Battaglia, Cathell, & Harrell,lJ.); id. at 76,803 A.2d at 504 (dissenting opinion) (Eldrige,j. & Bell,
C].).
136. See id. at 71, 803 A.2d at 501 (plurality opinion) (Battaglia, Cathell, & Harrell,lJ.). See also infra notes 149-153 and accompanying text.
137. See WhoUry, 370 Md. at 76, 803 A.2d at 503 (dissenting opinion) (Eldrige,j.
& Bell, CJ.). See infra notes 171-174 and accompanying text.
138. See WhoUry, 370 Md. 72-73,803 A.2d at 502 (concurring opinion) (Raker &
Wilner,lJ.). See infra notes 175-180 and accompanying text.
139. See WhoUry, 370 Md. at 48, 803 A.2d at 487.
140. See id. at 57-58, 803 A.2d at 493. See also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Wholey,
139 Md. App. 642, 648, 661, 779 A.2d 408, 411, 419 (1999), affd, 370 Md.
38, 803 A.2d 482 (2002) (indicating no reference to a state criminal statute
by the court of special appeals or the trial court).
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reporting a crime."141 Section 9-303 of the Criminal Law Article of
the Annotated Code of Maryland provides:
(a) Prohibited. - A person may not intentionally harm another or damage or destroy property with the intent of
retaliating against a victim or witness for:
(1) giving testimony in an official proceeding; or
(2) reporting a crime or delinquent act.
(b) Penalty. - A person who violates this section is guilty
of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to
imprisonment not exceeding five years. 142
Further, any person who "has reported a crime or delinquent act to a
law enforcement officer, prosecutor, intake officer, correctional officer, or judicial officer" pursuant to section 9-301 (d) (3) of the Criminal Law Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland is considered a
witness against whom retaliation for reporting a crime is
prohibited. 143
For the plurality, this statutory protection for witnesses of a crime
implied a public policy in favor of reporting criminal activity to public
authorities. 144 The plurality observed that "[f]rom these statutory provisions, a clearly definable public policy goal is derived: the Legislature sought to protect those witnesses who report suspected criminal
activity to the appropriate law enforcement or judicial authority from being
harmed for performing this important public task."145
Because this statute provided only a criminal penalty to a discharged whisdeblower, the plurality concluded that the tort was available to provide a civil cause of action. 146 The court thus held that
141. VVhoUry, 370 Md. at 57-58, 803 A.2d at 493 (citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 762 (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2001 Supp.».
142. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAw § 9-303 (2002) (corresponds to former MD.
ANN. CODE, art. 27, § 762 (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., Supp. 2001».
143. Id. § 9-301 (e) (corresponds to former MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 760(d) (3».
144. See VVhoUry, 370 Md. at 59, 803 A.2d at 494 (Battaglia,]., plurality).
145. Id. The court noted that the Arkansas Supreme Court recognized a similar
public policy favoring employee-informants in a 1988 case, in which it
based its public policy exception on a statute similar to Maryland's. Id. at
59 n.13, 803 A.2d at 494 n.18 (citing Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 743
S.W.2d 380, 385-86 (Ark. 1988».
146. See VVhoUry, 370 Md. at 59-60,803 A.2d at 494 (Battaglia,]., plurality) ("[W]e
now conclude that while Section 762 creates a criminal cause against those
who retaliate against witnesses who report crimes, the tort of wrongful discharge provides a civil remedy."). This recognition of a clear mandate of
public policy is similar to that in Insignia Residential Corp. v. Ashton, in which
the court of appeals recognized a clear mandate of public policy in the
criminal prohibition of solicitation of prostitution as a basis for the tort of
abusive discharge in circumstances where repeated, unwelcome sexual propositions by a foreman resulted in a constructive discharge of the employee. 359 Md. 560, 573, 755 A.2d 1080, 1087 (2000). Instead of pursuing
a statutory remedy under federal or state anti-discrimination in employment laws, the plaintiff chose to seek a common law tort remedy. Id. See
also John A. Gray, Sexual Harrassment, Prostitution, and the Tort of Abusive Dis-
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"terminating employment on the grounds that the employee (as a victim or witness) ... reported a suspected crime to the appropriate law enforcement or judicial officer is wrongful and contrary to public
policy."147 Theoretically, the state could have prosecuted whoever
fired Mr. Wholey for a criminal violation; and, if Mr. Wholey had reported the suspected theft to the police, he could have sued his employer, although not the supervisory co-employee, for wrongful
discharge. 148
On the issue of whether the tort was available to all whistle blowers ,
internal and external, the plurality rejected its availability to internal
whistleblowers. I49 While noting that other states had done SO,IS0 the
plurality refused because the state legislature enacted whistle blower
protection only for employees reporting violations to public enforcement authorities. 151
In the limited times that the Legislature has enacted whistle-blower protection to protect private employees, the protection is only valid when the employee/whistle-blower
reports the suspect activity externally. For example, Section
5-604(b) of the Labor and Employment Article protects an
employee who files a complaint or brings an action for violations of the Occupational Safety and Health title by his or
her employer. Maryland's anti-discrimination laws protect

147.

148.

149.
150.
151.

charge: An Analysis and Evaluation of Recent Legal Developments, 9 BUFF. WOo
MEN'S LJ. 169, 181 (2001). Similarly, the court of appeals recognized the
availability of the tort when an employee was discharged solely because the
employee filed a worker's compensation claim, because the law created a
criminal cause against the employer but no civil remedy for the victim. See
Finch v. Holladay-Tyler Printing, Inc., 322 Md. 197,200-02, 586 A.2d 1275,
1277-78 (1991) (citing Ewing v. Koppers Co., 312 Md. 45, 537 A.2d 1173
(1988».
WhoUry, 370 Md. at 61, 803 A.2d at 495. The tort of abusive discharge provides a remedy for the violation of a clear mandate of public policy in situations where a remedy is not otherwise available: "The first limiting factor
with respect to adopting a 'new' public policy mandate for a wrongful discharge claim is derived from the generally accepted purpose behind recognizing the tort in the first place: to provide a remedy for an otherwise
unremedied violation of public policy." Id. at 52, 803 A.2d at 490 (Battaglia,]., plurality).
[d. at 59-60,803 A.2d at 494. See also Moniodis v. Cook, 64 Md. App. 1, 14,
494 A.2d 212,218-19 (1985) (holding that a tort claim of action was available to a plaintiff employee when fired for refusing to take a lie detector test
when a state statute prohibited such a demand), superseded !Jy MD. ANN.
CODE art. 100, § 95; Weathersby v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Nat'l Mgmt.
Co., 86 Md. App. 533, 542, 587 A.2d 569, 573 (1990) (explaining that MD.
ANN. CODE art. 100, § 95, as amended, provides a statutory cause of action
for employees wrongfully discharged for refusing a polygraph test and codified the common law tort).
See WhoUry, 370 Md. at 63, 803 A.2d at 496-97 (Battaglia,]., plurality).
Id. at 63 n.15, 803 A.2d at 496 n.15 (Battaglia,]., plurality) (citing Sullivan
v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 802 F. Supp. 716, 724-25 (D. Conn. 1992».
See WhoUry, 370 Md. at 67-68,803 A.2d at 499-500 (Battaglia,]., plurality).
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private employees who have opposed any unlawful discriminatory practice in which the employer engages, or reported
... the employer's discriminatory practices. See Md. Code,
Art. 4gB, § 16(f). Similarly, with respect to Article 27, Section 762, the Legislature created a clear and unmistakable
prohibition against retaliating against a person who reports
criminal activity, externally, to the appropriate law enforcement authorities. We believe a corresponding common law
cause of action must also require external reporting to the
appropriate law enforcement authorities. 152
We refuse to take the specific factual circumstance before us
and induce from it an all-encompassing exception ... which
declares that the act of investigating criminal activity is a per se
public benefit, the termination for which, is actionable in
tort law. Our legislature has declined to encroach upon the
employment decisions of private companies through creation of a general all-encompassing "whistleblower protection" statute which would protect employees who investigate
and internally report suspected criminal activity; we, in turn,
decline to act in its stead .... We similarly limit the public
policy exception to those who report criminal activity to the
appropriate authorities. 153
In sum, protecting internal whistleblowers is not the public policy in
the state of Maryland, but protecting external whistle blowers is. Mter
addressing the principal issues of the case, the plurality next addressed Mr. Wholey's two contentions. 154 First, Mr. Wholey argued
that when investigating employee theft at Sears, he was acting not
merely as a Sears security officer but in his capacity as sworn deputy
sheriff. 155 The court rejected this argument on the grounds that Mr.
Wholey was merely fulfilling the specific private employment duty of
protecting the private proprietary interests of Sears, for which he was
hired, and did not face any specific legal risk for failing to pursue his
employer's requested investigation of employee thefts. 156
The court next addressed Mr. Wholey's second argument-that he
was acting in the public good by investigating criminal activity:
Nor can [Mr. Wholey] seek protection from an esoteric
theory about acting in the "public good" by investigating
criminal activity. The public good is best served by reporting
suspected criminal activity to law enforcement authorities; an
action which [Mr. Wholey]. . . did not take . . . . Further152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 63, 803 A.2d at 496-97 (Battaglia, j., plurality) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 67-68, 803 A.2d 499-500 (Battaglia, j., plurality).
See id. at 63-67, 803 A.2d at 497-99.
See id. at 63-64, 803 A.2d at 497.
See id. at 64-65, 803 A.2d at 497-98.
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more, we decline to create a tort cause of action based solely
on transcendental notions of that which is in the public interest, particularly when our own Legislature has declined to
make individual citizens criminally resr,onsible for failing to
investigate or report criminal activity. 1 7
The plurality then revisited the precedents primarily relied on by
the parties on appeal. 158 Mr. Wholey relied primarily on the decision
of the Supreme Court of Illinois in Palmateer. 159 While acknowledging
that the public reporting public policy exception created by the Illinois court twenty years earlier is the same as that created by the Court
of Appeals of Maryland in the instant case, the plurality criticized the
way in which the Palmateer court reached its decision. 160 Specifically,
the plurality stated:
The Palmateer court based its holding entirely on abstract notions of that which constitutes the public good. [S]uch a policy mandate was unsupported by any legislative enactment
and was grounded only in the obscure belief that public policy insists that all citizens become crime-fighters. The "ends"
may be similar, but the "means" by which we achieve those
ends are vastly different.
Our decision today is grounded in, and supported by, a
legislative enactment from which a public policy clearly
emanates. 161
The plurality then proceeded to discuss the court's previous decision in Adler III, on which Sears primarily relied on appeal. 162 The
WhoUy court agreed with the Fourth Circuit's rejection of the availability of the tort of abusive discharge to provide a remedy to internal
whistleblowers in Adler III and Milton. 163
Adler III and Milton preclude the availability of the tort of abusive
discharge for termination motivated by "public reporting" on the
grounds that the tort is available only when the plaintiff has refused to
commit an illegal act or has a statutory duty to report illegal activity.164
WhoUy, however, expands this limited application. "The critical distinguishing factor between Adler [III] and [Wholry] is that at the time
157. [d. at 65-66, 803 A.2d at 498. If Mr. Wholey had reported the suspected
criminal activity to the local police district and was fired for doing so, he
would have had a viable abusive discharge cause of action. [d. at 70, 803
A.2d at 500-01.
158. [d. at 66, 68-69, 803 A.2d at 498, 500 (Battaglia, J., plurality).
159. 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981); Wholey, 370 Md. at 66,803 A.2d at 498 (Battaglia,
J., plurality).
160. See Wholey, 370 Md. at 66-67, 803 A.2d at 498 (Battaglia, J., plurality).
161. [d. at 66-67,803 A.2d at 498-499 (Battaglia,J., plurality) (citations omitted).
162. See id. at 68-69, 803 A.2d at 500 (Battaglia, J., plurality); see also supra notes
110-113 and accompanying text.
163. See Wholey, 370 Md. at 69 n.18, 70, 803 A.2d at 500-01 n.18.
164. See id.
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Adler [III] was decided, the [Maryland] legislature had not [yet] enacted the [statutory] provision prohibiting retaliation against a witness
for reporting a crime."165 Therefore, the court observed, "no public
policy mandate regarding the reporting of criminal activity was discernible."166 As for Milton, while it was decided five years after the
enactment of the 1993 misdemeanor "witness protection" statute, the
Fourth Circuit continued to rely on the guidance provided by the
court of appeals in the first Adler case ("Adler /'), and the facts of the
case did not require it to address a remedy for external
whistleblowers. 167
On the one hand, the plurality's position is an acceptance of
Palmateer's outcome with a rejection of its "abstract" un-rooted approach to the source of its public policy.168 On the other hand, the
plurality affirmed Adler I's rejection of an internal whistleblowing abusive discharge tort while at the same time expanding the scope of the
availability of the tort in light of the 1993 misdemeanor witness protection statute and thereby creating a new external whistle blower abusive discharge tort. 169
In conclusion, the plurality stated:

Again, while no legal duty to report criminal activity exists in
Maryland, at least with respect to the factual circumstances
before us, the Legislature has determined that one who reports criminal activity to appropriate authorities should be
statutorily protected from retaliation for such conduct.
Therefore, we conclude that a public policy mandate exists
for employees who report criminal activity to the appropriate
authorities and are subsequently discharged from employment on this basis. We decline petitioner's invitation to
adopt a broader public policy mandate for conduct encompassing the investigation of suspected criminal activity of an
employee, being of the opinion that such a significant
change in our law is best left to the Legislature. 17o
In his very brief dissenting opinion,Judge Eldridge, joined by Chief
Judge Bell, dissented in two aspects: First, from the plurality's holding
that the tort was not available to Mr. Wholey; and, second, from the
plurality's restriction of the availability of the tort only to external
165. Id. at 69, 803 A.2d at 500.
166. Id.
167. See id. at 69 n.18, 803 A.2d at 500 n.18 (citing Adler v. Am. Standard Co.,
291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981)). The Court of Appeals of Maryland also
explained that changes in the Maryland Criminal Code had distinguished
its answer to a certified question from the federal district court in Maryland
that guided the Fourth Circuit's decision in Adler. Id.
168. See id. at 66,803 A.2d at 498 (Battaglia,]., plurality).
169. Id. at 70, 803 A.2d at 500-01 (Battaglia,]., plurality).
170. Id.
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whistle blowers. 171 All that is needed, the dissent stated, is "a sufficiently clear mandate of public policy to support [the plaintiff's] ...
cause of action."172 According to the dissent, the enactments by the
General Assembly protecting various categories of "employeewhistle blowers" "furnish a sufficiently clear mandate" in the instant
case. 173 In addition, the dissenting judges expressed their continued
disagreement with "the extremely narrow scope which majorities of
this court have repeatedly accorded the tort of abusive discharge ....
It is illogical to recognize a tort action and then hold that virtually
nothing falls within the action."174 The dissent does not expressly
state its agreement with the plurality'S recognition of the "public reporting" tort, but their concurrence is implicit in their argument for a
wider availability.
In her concurring opinion, Judge Raker, joined by Judge Wilner,
affirmed the denial of the tort to Mr. Wholey on the basis of "the wellreasoned opinion of the Court of Special Appeals."175 The concurrence rejected the availability of the tort for any whistleblowing for
two reasons. First, the case itself was "not ripe for such decision."176
In the concurring judge's view, there was no need to recognize the
availability of the tort for external whistleblowers because Mr. Wholey
was only an internal whistleblower. 177 No more was required from the
court, the concurrence argued, than its rejection of the availability of
the tort for this purpose. 178 Second, the concurrence rejected the
availability of the tort because the statute on which the plurality relied
171. Id. at 76, 803 A.2d at 504 (Eldridge, j., dissenting). While future wrongful
discharge tort appeal decisions are difficult to predict, it is important to
note that Judge Eldridge retired from the Court of Appeals of Maryland in
2003. His replacement, Judge Clayton Greene, Jr. from the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, was appointed in January of 2004.
172. Wholey, 370 Md. at 76, 803 A.2d at 504 (Eldridge,]., dissenting).
173. Id. The four statutory enactments discussed in the first part of this article
would probably satisfy the "sufficiently clear mandate" standard. See supra
Part II.
174. Wholey, 370 Md. at 76-77, 803 A.2d at 504-05 (Eldridge,]., dissenting). Associate Judge Eldridge's position has been stated in earlier cases. For example, the dissent in Chappell v. S. Md. Hosp., Inc., 320 Md. 483, 578 A.2d 766
(1990), in which Judge Eldridge joined, argued that "the adoption of limited administrative remedies for employment discrimination does not indicate a legislative intent to preclude a common law action in which much
more comprehensive relief can be obtained." Id. at 500, 578 A.2d at 775
(Adkins, Ret.]., dissenting).
175. Wholey, 370 Md. at 71, 803 A.2d at 501 (Raker,]., concurring).
176. Id. at 72, 803 A.2d at 502 (Raker,]., concurring).
177. See id. at 71-72, 803 A.2d at 502 (Raker,]., concurring).
178. See id. at 72, 803 A.2d at 502 (Raker,]., concurring). First, Mr. Wholey
argued that the tort should be available to all whistle blowers, internal and
external; and second, if restricted only to external, then the fact that while
employed by Sears he was simultaneously employed as a county Deputy
Sheriff made him an external whistleblower. See id. at 63-64, 803 A.2d at
497 (Battaglia, j., plurality).
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"does not place any duty upon an employee and is not an expression
of clearly mandated public policy that would support the exception
created . . . ." 179
[T]he plurality's reading of the statute expands the class of
people protected under § 762, which only protects a "victim
or witness" who [gives testimony or] reports a crime. Under
the plurality opinion, the protection of the statute applies to
any employee who reports suspected criminal activity to the
appropriate law enforcement officials, irrespective of
whether there is a duty to report, or whether the employee
was a testifYing victim or witness. 180
IV.
A.

COMMENTS
Are Internal Whistleblowers Ever Protected Under Maryland Law?

There is a question about the correctness of the Wholey plurality's
assertion that" [i) n the limited times that the Legislature has enacted
whistle-blower protection to protect private employees, the protection
is only valid when the employee/whistle-blower reports the suspect activity externally."181 As the plurality states, MOSHA provides protection only to those employees who are external whistleblowers. I82 Two
Maryland statutes, however, provide remedies to private employees
who are only internal whistle blowers. Article 49B, the Maryland
FEPA, creates a remedy for an employee who suffers employment retaliation simply because the employee has internally opposed a discrimination practice even when the opposing employee is not the
victim of the discriminatory action. 183 If the employer has fIfteen or
more employees, the employee may fIle a complaint with the Maryland HRC and follow its administrative procedures to get the statutory
remedies. I84 If the employer has less than fIfteen employees, and the
employee is the victim of retaliatory discharge-whether actual or
constructive-then the employee has a tort cause of action. I85 FurId. at 74, 803 A.2d at 503 (Raker, j., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 63, 803 A.2d at 496 (Battaglia, j., plurality).
See id.
See supra Part II.D.
See MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 15 (2003) (defining "employer" for purposes
ofFEPA as a business of fifteen or more employees); see id. § 9A (describing
the procedure by which an aggrieved employee can file a complaint with
the HRC).
185. Molesworth v. Brandon, 341 Md. 621, 637, 672 A.2d 608,616 (1996) (holding that the tort of abusive discharge is available to remedy gender-based
discharge by employers with fewer than fifteen employees). See also Gray,
Abusive Discharge supra note 99, at 15; Gray, Wrongful Discharge, supra note
99, at 82-85.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
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ther, the Maryland Health Care Workers Whistleblower Protection Act
expressly creates a remedy for internal whistleblowing. 186
While the Wholty court accurately asserted that the Maryland "legislature has declined to encroach upon the employment decisions of
private companies through creation of a general all-encompassing
'whistleblower protection' statute which would protect employees who
investigate and internally report suspected criminal activity,"187 it is
also true that the Maryland General Assembly has so intruded with
two of the three whistleblower statutes that it has enacted to protect
private sector employees. 188 As for the three Time whistleblowers,
none would have had any remedy under Maryland common law if
their employers had retaliated against them for reporting their concerns internally because none of the three had reported suspected
criminal activity to a public enforcement authority.
B.

Employer Defenses: Intentional Falsehood, Alternative Reason

In addition to the defense of a legitimate, alternative reason for an
adverse employment decision, the employer may also claim that the
employee's report was an intentional falsehood. 189 Generally, to prevail on a claim of retaliatory discharge, a whistleblower must prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) he made a good faith report of his employer's suspected criminal activity to an enforcement
authority; (2) the employer took an adverse action (discharge) against
him; and (3) the sole reason he was fired was because he made the
report. 190 The intentional falsehood defense may counter the first
standard element of a retaliatory discharge claim-that the employee
made a good faith report of suspected criminal activity.191 The Wholty
plurality asserted the lack of protection for those who knowingly make
a false disclosure: 192
Of course, the protection afforded to those who report
criminal activity would be eliminated should such report
prove to be false, in accordance with Article 27 Section 150
(a), which provides:
A person may not make a false statement, report, or
complaint, or cause a false statement, report, or complaint
to be made, to any peace or police officer of this State, ...
of any county, city or other political subdivision of this
186. See supra notes 53-54, 70 and accompanying text.
187. Wholey, 370 Md. at 67, 803 A.2d at 499.
188. The other statute, the Maryland Whistleblower Law, provides protection
only to employees of the state government's executive branch. See supra
Part II.A.
189. See Wholey, 370 Md. at 59 n.13, 803 A.2d at 494 n.13 (Battaglia,]., plurality).
190. See, e.g., Blackburn v. UPS, Inc., 179 F.3d 81, 92 (3d Cir. 1999); Duvall v.
Tex. Dept. of Human Servs., 802 S.W.3d 474, 478 (Tex. App. 2002).
191. See Wholey, 370 Md. at 59 n.13, 803 A.2d at 494 n.13 (Battaglia,]., plurality).
192. [d.
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State, ... or any material part thereof, to be false and with
intent to deceive and with intent to cause an investigation
or other action to be taken as a result thereof.
The Legislature's strong public interest in prohibiting false
police reports ... clearly supercedes any concern for retaliatory discharges that may ensue as a result of these false
reports. 193
As long as the employer cannot prove that employee has intentionally
and knowingly made a false report to enforcement authorities, the
fact that the substance of the disclosure is established to be false is
generally not sufficient to defeat a claim of retaliatory discharge. 194 A
larger challenge for the employer is to seek to defeat the third element of the retaliatory discharge claim-that the dismissal was caused
by the whistleblowing-by introducing evidence of other legitimate
reasons for the dismissal that, standing alone, would have resulted in
dismissal. 195

C.

Other Retaliatory Actions

The four Maryland statutes previously discussed provide a remedy
for any adverse retaliatory action. The "external whistle blower" tort of
abusive discharge, on the other hand, provides a remedy only when
the retaliatory action is a discharge, actual or constructive. 196 If the
adverse action is another retaliatory action-such as a demotion, a
change to less desirable assignments or work circumstances, or other
action less than dismissal-then there is generally no remedy for the
whistleblower. 197 Yet the prohibited employer motivation is identical-discriminating against an employee for reporting to public en193. Id.
194. See Obst v. Microtron, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 196, 200 (Minn. 2000) ("While
there need not be an actual violation of law, the reported conduct must at
least implicate a violation of law."). Also, although the courts will tolerate
an erroneous claim of suspected criminal activity, they generally will not
tolerate a claim made out of bad faith. Id. at 202.
195. The Maryland legislature allows the state to defend itself from a
whistle blower claim by asserting that an adverse action against a state executive branch employee would have been taken regardless of the employee's
disclosure of information. MD. CODE ANN, STATE PERS. & PENS. § 5-302
(1997 & Supp. 2003) (providing that the subtitle "does not preclude action
for defamation or invasion of privacy" and that the subtitle "does not prohibit a personnel action that would have been taken regardless of a disclosure of information").
196. Under Maryland law, an actual discharge is an express dismissal by the employer; a constructive discharge occurs when an employee quits under hostile or abusive circumstances that the employer deliberately created to
cause the employee to involuntarily resign. See Beye v. Bureau of Nat'l Mfairs, 59 Md. App. 642, 649-51, 477 A.2d 1197, 1201-02 (1984).
197. See Leese v. Baltimore County, 64 Md. App. 442, 467-68, 497 A.2d 159, 172
(1985) (stating that discharge is the first element for abusive discharge),
overruled on other grounds by Harford County v. Bel Air, 348 Md. 363, 704
A.2d 421 (1998).
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forcement authorities employer-controlled conduct as suspected
criminal activity. There is no principled basis for not recognizing a
tort cause of action whenever any employer adverse conduct is retaliatory.198 The absence of a comprehensive tort provides a perverse incentive to an employer to retaliate by punishing an employee in ways
other than by firing the employee so long as the employer's conduct
does not amount to a constructive discharge.
V.

CONCLUDING RECOMMENDATION

A.

Wisdom of Encouraging Internal Whistleblowers

Two Maryland statutes protect two kinds of internal whistleblowers:
those who internally oppose discriminatory practices 199 and those who
report violations of the law that constitute specific and substantial injury to the public health and safety.200 The Wholry plurality acknowledged that a case can be made for the protection of internal
whistleblowing. 201 The plurality ultimately concluded, however, that
its common law power with regard to the tort of abusive discharge was
restricted by the requirement of a clear mandate of public policy established by the legislature. 202 The plurality stated:
We acknowledge that some jurisdictions find the distinction between internal investigating and external reporting to
be irrelevant. For example, in Sullivan v. Massachusetts Mut.
Life Ins. Co, 802 F. Supp. 716 (D. Conn. 1992), the federal
court, in a prospective opinion concerning Massachusetts
law, considered the whistle-blowing claim of a former employee . . . . The employer contended that the plaintiff had
not made a sufficient claim because the suspected violations
were not reported to outside authorities, and the plaintiff
never threatened to speak of the suspected violations to any
authorities. . . . The court agreed with the plaintiff, finding
that internal whistleblowing was sufficient and said:
This rule makes sense. A rule that would permit the employer to fire a whistleblower with impunity before the employee contacted the authorities would encourage
employers promptly to discharge employees who bring
complaints to their attention, and would give employees
with complaints an incentive to bypass management and
go directly to the authorities. This would deprive manage198. See generally Gray, Wrongful Discharge, supra note 99, at 79.
199. See supra Part II.D (discussing the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act
and its applicability to internal whistleblowers).
200. See supra Part n.B (discussing the Health Care Worker Whistleblower Protection Act and its applicability to internal whistleblowers).
201. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing the WhoUry plurality's
acknowledgment of the fact that other states had extended the tort of abusive discharge to internal whistleblowers).
202. See supra notes 151-153 and accompanying text.
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ment of the opportunity to correct oversights straightaway,
solve the problem by disciplining errant employees, or
clear up a misunderstanding on the part of a
whistleblower. The likely result of a contrary rule would
be needless public investigations of matters best addressed
internally in the first instance. Employers benefit from a
system in which the employee reports suspected violations
to the employer first; the employee should not, in any
event, be penalized for bestowing that benefit on the employer ....
Whether the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut's hypothesis on how the requirement of external reporting may impact the internal employee reporting
has any merit is inapposite. We refuse to create a public policy grounded only in mere supposition about the employer/
employee relationship; the public policy mandates in this
State must be based on some discernible principle of law as
articulated by the Legislature or the courts. 203

B.

A Comprehensive State Statute

The Maryland General Assembly should consider enacting a comprehensive whistleblower statute along the lines of the Health Care
Act. First, a comprehensive statute with a one-year statute of limitations would provide a private cause of action with a reasonable limitation period. 204 Second, it would protect internal and external
whistleblowers 205 (other than those who go to the press), in both the
private and public (other than those employed in the executive
branch)206 sectors. Third, it would require as a condition of protection that the employee first attempt to resolve the situation internally
and have submitted a signed statement to the employer about the suspected violation. Fourth, it would allow for an employer defense of
dismissal for a reason other than the employee's disclosure of the information. Fifth, it would provide for an award of reasonable attorney's fees and expenses to the employer if an employee brings an
action in bad faith and without a basis in law or fact.
203. Wholey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 370 Md. 38, 63 n.15, 803 A.2d 482, 496
n.15 (2002) (Battaglia, j., plurality) (citations omitted).
204. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing the similar provisions
of the Health Care Worker Whistleblower Protection Act).
205. The enactment of a comprehensive statute that protects internal
whistleblowers as well as external whistle blowers would provide an incentive
to corporations to implement "a mechanism for its employees to report
organizational wrongdoing" without fear of reprisal and thus capture the
corporate benefits of "improved worker safety, morale, and conduct, as well
as decreased legal risk." Callahan et aI., supra note 22, at 196.
206. Employees of the executive branch are covered by Executive Branch Employee Whistleblower Protection Act. See Part ILA.
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The enactment of this type of comprehensive statute clearly would
preempt Wholey. It would also raise the question of how its enactment
relates to the earlier four specific statutes. The gap in the Health Care
Act is that it applies only to disclosures by non-state licensed employees reporting suspected violations of a law that created specific substantial threats to public health or safety.207 It does not cover all
employees and all violations of the law. 208 The proposed comprehensive statute would cover this type of gap.
The gap under the Maryland FEPA is that there is no statutory or
common law remedy for employees of "statutory small employers"
who are the victims of retaliatory action other than discharge. The
proposed statute would provide a remedy for these types of
whistle blowers. 209
Finally, the MOSHA does not provide a remedy for retaliatory actions against internal whistleblowers. 210 A new, comprehensive statute
would also fill that gap by providing a tort remedy. Under such a
statute, if Time's featured "Person of the Year" had suffered retaliatory
actions from their employers for their internal whistle blowing activities, they would have had a legal remedy in Maryland.

207. See supra notes 60 and accompanying text.
208. Id.
209. One difficulty here is the existing disparity in remedies available under the
tort theory of recovery in contrast with those available under the statute.
See generally Gray, Abusive Discharge, supra note 99, at 13.
210. See Part II.C.

